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Abstract
When some agents want to communicate through a me-
dia stream (for example voice or video), the Real Time Pro-
tocol (RTP) is used. This protocol does not provide encryp-
tion, so it is necessary to use Secure RTP (SRTP) to secure
the communication. In order for this to work, the agents
need to agree on key material and ZRTP provides them with
a procedure to perform this task: it is a key agreement pro-
tocol, which relies on a Diffie-Hellman exchange to gener-
ate SRTP session parameters, providing confidentiality and
protecting against Man-in-the-Middle attacks even without
a public key infrastructure or endpoint certificates. This is
an analysis of the protocol performed with ProVerif, which
tests security properties of ZRTP; in order to perform the
analysis, the protocol has been modeled in the applied pi-
calculus1.
1. Introduction
In the last years research has strongly focused on proofs
of security. The verification step to ensure that a computer
program or a protocol have certain requested properties is
a crucial one, and this task has to be done preferentially by
formal reasoning, rather than by tests and simulations, as
the latter approach is not as exhaustive as the formal one.
There are two possible approaches to protocol verifica-
tion: the formal model and the computational model. In
the first model, we are in a highly idealized setting, there-
fore this can be effectively implemented in fully-automated
protocol verifiers. The second approach borrows ideas from
complexity theory and requires much more human interven-
tion in proofs, and it is being automated only in very recent
times. [5]
These verification techniques allow us to uncover design
faults that may remain hidden for years. There are a lot
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of examples that can be recalled on this topic, for example
a successful application of verification in the formal model
can be found in [8, 9]: the popular Needham-Schroeder pro-
tocol dates back to 1978, but it was just in 1995 that Gavin
Lowe found that an attack on the protocol was possible and
proposed a modification. To achieve this goal Gavin Lowe
has used the tool FDR, which is a model checker for CSP.
Besides generic model checkers such as FDR, there
are tools which have been conceived with communication
protocols in mind. In the present paper we use Bruno
Blanchet’s ProVerif: if the original Needham-Schroeder
protocol is analysed with this tool, this same security flaw
can be uncovered and a trace of the attack given.
The purpose of the present paper is to present the re-
sults of a proof of security on the ZRTP protocol in the for-
mal model. This protocol is being submitted as a RFC to
the IETF by Philip Zimmermann, Alan Johnston and Jon
Callas [11]: the purpose of this protocol is to provide key
agreement and parameter negotiation to establish an SRTP
session.
SRTP (Secure RTP) is a secure profile of RTP (Real-time
Transport Protocol): it deals with security and privacy is-
sues that are not built-in to RTP. Agents wishing to commu-
nicate by means of SRTP must agree on session keys and
parameters in order to establish a secure session: these ne-
gotiations may be effectively made through ZRTP.
ZRTP bases the key agreement procedure on a Diffie-
Hellman exchange and on cached secrets established in pre-
ceding sessions (if any): this creates a new shared secret,
from which all key material can be derived by means of
one-way functions.
In case no valid secret is found in the cache, the proto-
col is vulnerable to a Man-in-the-Middle attack. To ensure
that this attack has not been performed, ZRTP provides a
method to detect it: the agents have a short authentication
string (SAS), which is a one-way function of the ZRTP ses-
sion key and that can be verbally compared. If the SASs do
not match an attack is taking place.
Keying material is destroyed at the end of each session,
thus ZRTP offers perfect forward secrecy.
Some key continuity is kept by means of cached secrets:
Figure 1. Key agreement call flow.
after each successful key agreement the cache is updated
with a secret, which is a one-way function of the new secret
generated through the key agreement procedure.
One key feature of ZRTP is that it does not rely on SIP
signaling for key management, on any server or on any kind
of public key infrastructure: only the endpoints have to in-
teract for the key agreement to be performed.
ZRTP provides also protection against Denial-of-Service
attacks, as it offers a way to detect and reject false ZRTP
messages.
2. Protocol Description
In this section we will provide a brief description of the
protocol, in order to show the way it works and how it en-
ables two agents to agree on the key material and parameters
needed for an SRTP session.
ZRTP has three possible working modes:
• the Diffie-Hellman mode is based on a Diffie-Hellman
exchange: all SRTP keys are computed from the secret
value computed by each party;
• the Multistream mode is usable only if there is already
an active SRTP session between the endpoints: new
SRTP keys for a new stream can be derived from a
the preceding Diffie-Hellman exchange, avoiding the
expensive computations of a new one;
• the Preshared mode does not rely on a Diffie-Hellman
exchange, but on previously cached secrets only. This
is secure as far as the secret cache is not corrupted. In-
deed, even in this case, it mantains the perfect forward
secrecy of the protocol, as keying material is deleted
as soon as each session is terminated.
The present paper addresses the Diffie-Hellman mode
only, as it is the setting where an attack can be performed:
if no attack has succeeded in this session, the agents share
reliable secrets, therefore all subsequent sessions in Multi-
stream or Preshared mode that rely on them are safe, un-
der the assumption that integrity of the secret cache is pre-
served.
During the run of the protocol two agents exchange mes-
sages: the initiator and the responder.
The key agreement and negotiation algorithm can be di-
vided into 4 steps (see Figure 1):
• discovery — the agents exchange information about
their identity and the supported session parameters;
• hash committment — the initiator starts the key agree-
ment procedure;
• Diffie-Hellman exchange and key derivation — public
keys are exchanged;
• confirmation — the endpoints acknowledge the suc-
cessful key agreement.
After the discovery phase, when the endpoints have ex-
changed some basic information, the first step towards the
negotiation of the key material is made with the hash com-
mitment: besides containing all the session parameters that
will have to be used and defining the roles in the protocol (it
is symmetrical in the discovery phase, and the agent sending
this message is the one who is willing to act as the initiator),
it contains a value that commits the initiator not to change
his Diffie-Hellman key pair.
In fact the initiator creates his keys prior to sending the
hash commitment, but cannot reveal them immediately, as
doing so could enable the other party (or an attacker) to
choose maliciously his keys depending on the initiator’s
choice. The solution is to send a hash of the keys, concate-
nated to a hash of the message sent by the responder during
the discovery phase: this second thing protects the protocol
against bid-down attacks, that aim at making the agents rely
on weaker algorithms, as an attacker may alter the infor-
mation on supported session parameters. Finally the hash
commitment prevents the agents from being able to influ-
ence deterministically the SAS: it is a function of the ex-
changed messages, so it can be influenced by an opportunis-
tic choice of the agents’ key — this cannot be done as the re-
sponder chooses his keys before knowing the initiator keys,
and the initiator chooses his key before sending the hash
commitment, that binds him to that choice. After the hash
commitment the agents can perform the Diffie-Hellman ex-
change: they compute the Diffie-Hellman result by mod-
ular exponentiation of the other party’s public key to the
power of their own private key, thus computing a value that
is known only to the two of them. Along with the key they
send also a HMAC, keyed with a known string, for each
retained secret that they already share: this allows them to
distinguish matching secrets from non-matching ones (and
discard them).
Figure 2. The Dolev-Yao model.
Both of these shared secrets will be concatenated with
the hash of all the exchanged messages: the hash of this
concatenation will be the new shared secret between the
agents.
All the key material needed to establish a SRTP session
will be derived from this shared secret by means of a vari-
ation of the HMAC function, keyed with different strings
depending on the particular key to be generated. Also SAS
is derived in this way. Once these operations have been
completed, the endpoints exchange the confirmation mes-
sages to acknowledge that the key agreement procedure has
been successful. They contain an encrypted block, which
is encrypted using the newly generated keys: verifying the
secrecy of this block will be the way to ensure that the pro-
tocol is safe.
The message exchange is protected with a chain of
HMACs that cover each message: each HMAC is keyed
with a value that is transmitted in clear only in the follow-
ing message (thus it can be verified only in that moment).
Moreover the values used as keys for the HMACs are gener-
ated from an 8-word nonce by subsequent hashing: for this
reason they are referred to as hash images. The coherency
of a hash image can be verified upon receipt of the follow-
ing one. The original 8-word nonce is transmitted in the
encrypted part of the confirmation messages.
3. Analysis
In the proposed analysis the protocol is modeled in the
Applied pi-calculus: the agents taking part in the protocol
are expressed as two concurrent processes. The agents in-
teract in a scenario, which is normally referred to as Dolev-
Yao model, described in the following subsection.
3.1. The Dolev-Yao model
The Dolev-Yao model [7], schematised in Figure 2, as-
sumes that:
• the net is under the intruder’s control: messages can be
intercepted and altered. New messages can be injected
to the net;
• the cryptographic primitives are perfect;
• the protocol admits any number or participants and any
number of parallel sessions;
• the protocol messages can be of any size.
The above formal model can be effectively captured by
automatic protocol verifiers and it is much easier to be
implemented than computational models: most automatic
proofs on protocols have been done in this model.
In this model we can reason about an idealized version
of the protocol, so we can abstract from the implementa-
tion issues: for example a flaw in an implementation of a
protocol due to overflow will not be detected in the formal
model, but a flaw due to misconception of the protocol will
be found by a protocol verifier.
TERMS M,N :==
Variables x,y,z
Names a,b,c,k,s
Constructor f(M1, . . . ,Mn)
PROCESSES P,Q:==
Output M〈N〉.P
Input M(x).P
Destructor let x = g(M1, . . . ,Mn) in P else Q
Conditional if M = N then P else Q
Nil process 0
Parallel P |Q
Replication !P
Restriction (νa).P
Figure 3. The syntax of the applied pi-calculus.
Initiator =
νSVI. generate secret value
νH0I. generate hash image H0I
let {H1I = H(H0I)} in compute hash image H1I
let {H2I = H(H1I)} in compute hash image H2I
let {H3I = H(H2I)} in compute hash image H3I
hellor((HELLOSTRINGRI,H3RI,HMACHELLORI)). wait for Hello message
helloackr〈helloack〉. send HelloACK message
helloi〈(hellostringi,H3I,HM ((hellostringi,H3I),H2I))〉. send Hello message
helloacki(HELLOACKRI). wait for HelloACK message
let {PVI = gSVI} in compute public value
let {SECRETSIDI = HM (initiator,secrets)} in compute IDs of the secrets
let {HVI = H((PVI,SECRETSIDI,H1I,HELLOSTRINGRI,H3RI))} in compute hash commitment
commit〈(commitstring,HVI,H2I, send Commit message
HM ((commitstring,HVI,H2I),H1I))〉.
dhpart1((PVRI,SECRETSIDRI,H1RI,HMACDHPART1RI)). wait for DHPart1 message
if H3RI = H(H(H1RI)) then check H3R
if HMACHELLORI = HM ((HELLOSTRINGRI,H3RI),H(H1RI)) then check Hello HMAC
if SECRETSIDRI = HM (responder,secrets) then check responder’s IDs of the secrets
dhpart2〈(PVI,SECRETSIDI,H1I,HM ((PVI,SECRETSIDI,H1I),H0I))〉. send DHPart2 message
confirm1((CONFIRMRI,HMACSECRI,ENCH0RI,ENCSECRI)). wait for Confirm1 message
let {MHI = H((HELLOSTRINGRI,H3RI,commitstring,HVI,H2I, compute the message hash
PVRI,SECRETSIDRI,H1RI,PVI,SECRETSIDI,H1I))} in
let {S0I = H((PVRISVI,secrets,MHI))} in compute S0
let {ZRTPKEYI = K(S0I,zrtpi)} in compute ZRTP key
let {ZRTPKEYRI = K(S0I,zrtpr)} in compute responder’s ZRTP key
let {H0RI = DZRTPKEYRI(ENCH0RI)} in decrypt H0R
let {SECRI = DZRTPKEYRI(ENCSECRI)} in decrypt responder’s secret block
if H1RI = H(H0RI) then check H1R
if HMACDHPART1RI = HM ((PVRI,SECRETSIDRI,H1RI),H0RI) then check Confirm2 HMAC
if HMACSECRI = HM ((H0RI,SECRI),ZRTPKEYRI) then check integrity of encrypted part
confirm2〈(confirmi,HM ((H0I,ZRTPKEYI),ZRTPKEYI), send Confirm2 message
EZRTPKEYI(H0I), EZRTPKEYI(SECI))〉.
conf2ack(CONF). send Conf2ACK message
Figure 4. The “Initiator” process
3.2. Applied pi-calculus and ProVerif
In order to reason about cryptographic protocols, Martı´n
Abadi and Ce´dric Fournet have built the applied pi-calculus
[2] on top of Milner’s pi-calculus [10]: the main thing is
that names are replaced by terms (the atomic values of the
pi-calculus are not enough to deal efficiently with the com-
plexity of a cryptographic protocol). By using equational
theories, it is possible to take fully advantage of this cal-
culus to test security properties of communication proto-
cols, as they allow to account for equational properties of
the functions used in the protocols.
The syntax of the applied pi-calculus is shown in Figure
3.
Once the protocol has been modeled in the Applied pi-
calculus (see Figures 4 and 5), the analysis can be per-
formed with the tool ProVerif [1, 3] and will provide a for-
mal proof of security for the model. ProVerif translates the
Applied pi-calculus process into a set of Horn clauses, that
account for the initial knowledge of the attacker, for the in-
ference rules he can apply to broaden his knowledge pool
and for the messages that can be sent over the communica-
tion channels: by means of a resolution algorithm ProVerif
will derive new clauses, which must not allow an attacker
to compromise the protocol.
In the case of the present paper, the goal is proving that
secrecy of data encrypted under the key, on which the agents
have agreed by means of the protocol, is preserved and data
is not disclosed to an attacker.
Responder =
νSVR. generate secret value
νH0R. generate hash image H0R
let {H1R = H(H0R)} in compute hash image H1R
let {H2R = H(H1R)} in compute hash image H2R
let {H3R = H(H2R)} in compute hash image H3R
hellor〈(hellostringr,H3R,HM ((hellostringr,H3R),H2R))〉. send Hello message
helloackr(HELLOACKIR). wait for HelloACK message
helloi((HELLOSTRINGIR,H2IR,HMACHELLOIR)). wait for Hello message
helloacki〈helloack〉. send HelloACK message
commit((COMMITSTRINGIR,HVIR,H2IR,HMACCOMMITIR)). wait for Commit message
if H3IR = H(H2IR) then check H3I
if HMACHELLOIR = HM ((HELLOSTRINGIR,H3IR),H2IR) then check Hello HMAC
let {PVR = gSVR} in compute public value
let {SECRETSIDR = HM (responder,secrets)} in compute IDs of the secrets
dhpart1〈(PVR,SECRETSIDR,H1R,HM ((PVR,SECRETSIDR,H1R),H0R))〉. send DHPart1 message
dhpart2((PVIR,SECRETSIDIR,H1IR,HMACDHPART2IR)). wait for DHPart2 message
if H2IR = H(H1IR) then check H2I
if HMACCOMMITIR = HM ((COMMITSTRINGIR,HVIR,H2IR),H1IR) then check Commit HMAC
if SECRETSIDIR = HM (initiator,secrets) then check initiator’s IDs of the secrets
if HVIR = H((PVIR,SECRETSIDIR,hellostringr,H3R)) then check HVI
let {MHR = H((hellostringr,H3R,COMMITSTRINGIR,HVIR,H2IR, compute the message hash
PVR,SECRETSIDR,H1R,PVIR,SECRETSIDIR,H1IR))} in
let {S0R = H((PVIRSVR,secrets,MHR))} in compute S0
let {ZRTPKEYR = K(S0R,zrtpr)} in compute ZRTP key
confirm1〈(confirmr,HM ((H0R,ZRTPKEYR),ZRTPKEYR), send Confirm1 message
EZRTPKEYR(H0R), EZRTPKEYR(SECR))〉.
confirm2((CONFIRMIR,HMACSECIR,ENCH0IR,ENCSECIR)). wait for Confirm2 message
let {ZRTPKEYIR = K(S0R,zrtpi)} in compute initiator’s ZRTP key
let {H0IR = DZRTPKEYIR(ENCH0IR)} in decrypt H0I
let {SECIR = DZRTPKEYIR(ENCSECIR)} in decrypt initiator’s secret block
if H1IR = H(H0IR) then check H1I
if HMACDHPART2IR = HM ((PVIR,SECRETSIDIR,H1IR),H0IR) then check Confirm2 HMAC
if HMACSECIR = HM ((H0IR,SECIR),ZRTPKEYIR) then check integrity of encrypted part
conf2ack〈conf〉. send Conf2ACK message
Figure 5. The “Responder” process
3.3. Protocol model and results
The protocol has been modeled in the following way:
• there is no mismatch in the secrets: the key agreement
procedure can rely on this for key generation. This
is ideally the typical run of the protocol, when SAS
has been verified in the very first session between the
agents and the secret cache has been correctly updated
in each subsequent session;
• publicly known dummy constants have been used for
what does not concern security;
• no negotiations is done during the discovery phase,
thus the hash function is predefined and publicly
known, as well as encryption algorithms, ZRTP ver-
sion and so on.
We challenge the adversary to derive the terms that are
sent encrypted under the negotiated key in the confirmation
messages: if there is no way that an adversary can derive
them by applying the rules, then the protocol is safe, as this
means that the key agreement procedure has not been com-
promised and thus the key negotiated between the endpoints
is a safe one.
Among the functions that will be used in the proto-
col there are one-way functions, such as the hashing func-
tion H, the function to compute HMACs HM and the key
derivation function K: for these functions only a construc-
tor is declared. The lack of the appropriate destructor makes
it impossible to recover the argument passed to any of these
functions.
The encryption functions are different, as a destructor is
declared: when a message is encrypted under the key k via
the function E , it can be recovered by using the function D,
provided that the correct key k is passed to this function.
Finally the model is equipped with an equational theory
that accounts for the commutative property of the exponen-
tial:
(gx)y = (gy)x
The messages are distinguished one from the other by
having a different channel for each message type: channels
are declared as free names and they belong to the initial
knowledge of the attacker, i.e. any data flowing through
these channels is knowable by the attacker. Since the be-
ginning the attacker knows also any constant used in the
protocol, such as the base of the exponentials or the con-
stant strings. The terms to be sent under encryption are de-
clared as private free names: this means that they do not be-
long to the initial knowledge pool of the attacker, i.e. there
will be no Horn clause stating that the attacker knows those
free names. ProVerif shows the protocol to be secure in
a Dolev-Yao network, as the attacker cannot derive these
terms: if the key agreement procedure can be performed,
then we have the formal proof that an attacker cannot have
compromised it and have broken into the session.
4. Conclusions
In the present paper the protocol run has been modeled as
two concurrent processes that interact by exchanging mes-
sages, synchronizing on every message exchange.
The model does not bother with all the negotiation proce-
dure of the discovery phase, as this is unessential to prove
the security of the protocol: according to the Dolev-Yao
model, the cryptographic functions are idealized, so every
algorithm is just as strong as any other; moreover the cho-
sen algorithms are publicly known, as they are sent in clear
in the Commit message.
The analysis performed on the protocol has formally
proven that ZRTP is a safe key agreement protocol: two
endpoints that use it to agree on a key can be sure that their
communications are secured against any attack. For this to
happen it is crucial that there are some pre-shared secrets:
if this is not the case, ProVerif shows that a Man-in-the-
Middle attack is possible. This is the reason why one needs
to use SAS to ensure that this attack has not been performed
on the first session between the two agents: in this session
a reliable shared secret will be created, and therefore all the
subsequent sessions will be secured.
It must be noted that this is true under the assumption
that SAS provides an effective way to detect the presence
of an attacker. [6]
More in general, the present paper highlights the benefits
of using the applied pi-calculus and ProVerif to reason about
cryptographic protocols: the model of the protocol accounts
for all the peculiarities of a typical run of the ZRTP protocol
and therefore provides a good support for reasoning about
ZRTP, in view of future modifications and improvements.
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